The Zero Bound and the Term Structure in a Nonlinear Macroeconomic Model by Wolman, Alexander L.
The Zero Bound and the Term 
Structure in a Nonlinear 
Macroeconomic Model 
Alexander L. Wolman* 
The zero bound on nominal interest rates inherently imposes 
a nonlinearity on models in which money is nonneutral. 
However, for simplicity, analyses of the zero bound have 
typically been conducted in models which are otherwise linear. 
In a nonlinear staggered price-setting model. we examine how 
the zero bound makes the term structure of interest rates and 
macroeconomic dynamics sensitive to the economy's average 
inflation rate. We decompose this sensitivity into two compo- 
nents: (i) A pure expectations component, associated with the 
fact that the average inflation rate and the zero bound interact 
to affect the expected future path of short rates; and (ii) a term 
premium component, associated with the fact that the afore- 
mentioned interaction alters the behavior of the term premium. 
The first component is present in analyses where the zero 
bound is the only nonlinearity; the second component is absent 
in those analyses. 
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I. Introduction 
The fact that nominal interest rates are bounded by zero 
suggests that the term structure of lnterest rates may not be 
invariant to the average level of inflation (the "inflation target"): If 
the inflation target is very low, short-term nominal rates might be 
expected to occasionally hit the zero bound, whereas if the inflation 
target is moderately high, short-term rates would be expected to 
remain away from zero. We explore the sensitivity of the term 
structure to the inflation target in a simple staggered price-setting 
model. Because the model is fundamentally nonlinear, there are 
two mechanisms through which the inflation target may affect the 
term structure. First, a t  low levels of the inflation target the 
possibility of future short-term nominal interest rates hitting zero 
means that the expected path of future short rates may be 
sensitive to the inflation target. This channel is present in linear 
models embedding the pure expectations hypothesis of the term 
structure. See for example Ruge-Murcia (forthcoming). In addition, 
the zero bound may make the conditional correlation between 
future marginal utility and future short rates sensitive to the 
inflation target. This conditional correlation drives the term 
premium in the long-term rate. 
Our analysis is meant to be illustrative, but extensions of this 
work may prove to have practical importance. In the United States 
much attention has been devoted to the "conundrum" of long-term 
interest rates barely moving even as the Federal Reserve has raised 
i t s  target for the short-term interest rates by more then two 
percentage points from 2003 to 2005. To the extent that this 
behavior is anomalous relative to previous episodes of rising short- 
term rates, one relevant consideration may be that perceptions 
about the inflation target have changed. Also, the experience with 
very low interest rates in 2003 and 2004 may have altered 
perceptions about the conditional correlation between real outcomes 
and future short rates. 
There has been an explosion of research related to the zero 
bound on nominal interest rates in recent years. Much of this work 
is normative monetary (and fiscal) policy analysis. See for example 
Eggertsson and Woodford (2003). Svensson (2OO3), and the articles 
and discussions in the May 2000 Journal of Money, Credit and 
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Banking. Research in this vein emphasizes what monetary policy 
should do if the nominal interest rate is zero, or prescribes policy 
rules aimed partly at preventing the zero bound from becoming a 
problem. In contrast. this paper is entirely positive: For a given 
policy rule, we ask the model how the term structure of interest 
rates will behave at two different levels of the inflation target. 
Interaction between the zero bound and the term structure has  
not been ignored in the literature. Ruge-Murcia(forthcoming), 
mentioned above, is perhaps closest to this paper in that his is a 
positive analysis of how the zero bound can be expected to alter 
the relationship between long and short-term rates. Skallsjo (2004) 
studies the implications of optimal monetary policy for the term 
structure in the presence of the zero bound. His model assumes 
risk neutrality. so the expectations hypothesis holds. Bernanke, 
Reinhart, and Sack(2004) among others, examine the extent to 
which monetary policy actions aimed at influencing the term 
structure can be effective in achieving policy goals when the 
short-term interest rate is at or near zero. 
Several papers have studied the term structure of interest rates 
during the ongoing period of near-zero nominal interest rates in 
Japan, including Fujiki and Shiratsuka (200 1). Nagayasu (2004) and 
Oda and Ueda(2005). One theme of that work has been a n  
assessment of the effect of Japan's policy changes - the zero 
interest rate policy and then the quantitative easing policy - on the 
behavior of the term structure. In particular, Oda and Ueda use a 
small macro model to investigate how these policy changes affected 
the term structure through both the pure expectations channel and 
the risk premium channel. The macro model is linear, but they 
combine it with a no-arbitrage model of the term structure so that 
there is a risk premium in long-term interest rates. In principle, 
the approach taken in this paper can be complementary to Oda 
and Ueda's work. Because we are explicit about the dynamic 
macroeconomic equilibrium, the macro model directly generates the 
term structure, including the risk premium. In addition, the fact 
that the macroeconomic model is itself nonlinear expands the scope 
for changes in the policy rule to change the nature of the risk 
premium "process."l 
'The attraction of modeling the term structure and the macroeconomy 
jointly in an equilibrium framework is clear. However, it should be admitted 
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The paper proceeds a s  follows. In section 11 we provide 
background on the term structure of interest rates from the 
perspective of an (unspecified) dynamic general equilibrium model. 
This material is quite standard, but it will be useful for motivating 
the rest of the paper. Section 111 presents the specific macro- 
economic model in some detail. We also explain the nonlinear 
method used to solve the model. Surprisingly, though there is no 
shortage of research using sticky-price models such a s  this one. 
that research has almost exclusively worked with linearized versions 
of the models. Readers who wish to study the full nonlinear 
versions of these models may find section I11 a useful guide. 
Section IV contains results. For the calibrated model, we first 
illustrate how the equilibrium behavioral relationships and pricing 
functions vary depending on whether the inflation target is high 
enough to keep nominal interest rates away from zero. Then we 
simulate the model economy, again comparing two inflation targets 
which differ in their implications for whether nominal interest rates 
occasionally are zero. Section V concludes. 
11. Background on the Term Structure 
The premise of this paper is that the central bank's inflation 
target may affect the behavior of the term structure of interest 
rates. Because the term structure is a t  the heart of the paper, in 
this section we derive in some detail a standard expression for the 
relationship between long-term and short-term interest rates implied 
by a macroeconomic model with representative households. In the 
next section we will specify one such model, but here we simply 
derive the term structure for the general case. 
Define Q l . r + s  to be the dollar price in period t of an s-period 
discount bond that pays one dollar in period t + s .  The implied 
s-period net nominal interest rate in period t then satisfies 
that past efforts along these lines have not met with much empirical 
success, leading to the popularity of the no-arbitrage approach. 
THE ZERO BOUND AND THE TERM STRUCTURE 151 
where we have expressed the s period rate in comparable terms 
(e.g. quarterly) to the one period rate. Now suppose there is a 
representative household who discounts the future at rate P, and 
whose marginal (utility) value of real wealth in period t is At, and 
let the price level be denoted Pl. Then the price of an s-period bond 
is given by 
Intuitively, it costs (A(/Pl) Qt,L+s in utility terms to purchase one 
bond in period t, and in return the bond pays off PSEt [A~+,lPt+~l in 
discounted utility terms in period t+s. With optimal behavior by 
households, the current cost of the bond is identical to the future 
benefit. 
We now specialize to the case of s=2. so as to derive a 
relationship between the two-period rate, the current one-period 
rate, and the uncertain future one-period rate. With s=2, Equations 
(1) and (2) imply 
Since the one-period rate satisfies 
we can rewrite (3) as 
The next step is to note that from the expression for the one-period 
rate in period t+ 1 (that is, (4) one period ahead) we can express 
the two-period rate as 
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where we have also used the fact that El (;l~+z/Pt+z)=E,(Et+~ (At+z /  
PL+z)) by the law of iterated expectations. 
Flnally, we use the fact that 
A+ I 1 at+ I 
El -.- 1 + COU A l + l  1 [ Pt+1 ~+R{: ' I  I=''(%) '(K' 
to express the two-period rate a s  
A similar expression can be derived for the s-period rate, but  for 
the sake of simplicity we will restrict attention to two-period rates, 
and we will refer to them as short and long rates. 
The first factor in (7) represents the expectations theory of the 
tenn structure; if the covariance between future marginal utillty 
and the future price of a short-term bond is zero, then the current 
long rate is pinned down by the current short rate and the 
conditional expectation of the future price of the short term bond. 
If the aforementioned covariance is nonzero. its presence in the 
second factor drives a wedge between the long rate and the 
expectations hypothesis. 
To get some intuition for the role of the covariance in (7). 
compare two strategies for obtaining one dollar in period t+2  by 
saving in period t .  The first strategy involves buying a one-period 
bond, selling it in period L +  1 and then using the proceeds to buy 
a one-period bond which will pay off in period t+2 .  The second 
strategy involves buying and holding a two-period bond. If there is 
positive covariance between future marginal utility of nominal 
wealth and the future bond price, then rolling over the one-period 
bond I s  "expensive." Positive covariance means that future marginal 
utility tends to be high when the future bond price is high. In that 
case, there is a high dollar cost of purchasing a one-period bond 
next period in precisely those circumstances in which the utility 
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value of a dollar's consumption is high. With positive covariance 
the consumer is willing to pay a premium (over the pure 
expectations theory) to buy a long-term bond that avoids the 
high-cost of rolling over a short-term bond after one period. This 
price premium from a positive covariance is reflected in a lower 
value for the interest rate Rj2' in (7). 
Our purpose in this paper is to investigate the effect of the 
inflation target on the behavior of the term structure, working 
through the zero bound on nominal interest rates. We will 
summarize the term structure by the slope of the yield curve (ytl, 
which we define as follows, based on (7): 
Also from (7). we have 
According to the expectations theory of the term structure, the 
slope of the yield curve is positive if the price of a one-period bond 
is expected to fall from period t to period t+  1 (this is the effect of 
the numerator in (9)). The covariance term (risk premium) in the 
denominator implies that even if the price of a one-period bond is 
not expected to change, the yield curve can be positively (negative- 
ly) sloped if there is negative (positive) conditional covariance 
between the future price of a one-period bond and the future 
marginal utility of nominal wealth. 
If the zero bound induces an effect of the inflation target on the 
slope of the yield curve, it must work through some combination of 
the expected future bond price and the covariance between that 
price and marginal utility. That the former effect exists seems clear, 
at least in principle: If the inflation target is low enough that the 
interest rate on a short-term bond occasionally is zero, then the 
conditional expectation of future bond prices must differ from the 
case where the inflation target is high enough for the short-rate 
154 S E O U L  JOUHNAI,  O F  ECONOMICS 
never to hit zero. Although it is less straight.forward, we conjecture 
that the latter effect will also generally be present in a fully specified 
macroeconomic model with some form of monetary nonneutrality.2 
That effect simply requires that in the low-inflation target case, the 
economy's equilibrium behavior involves a different covariance 
between the price of short term securities and the marginal utility 
of nominal wealth than in the case where interest rates never hit 
zero. We could continue speculating about how this covariance 
would change with the inflation target, but instead we will specify a 
model and then investigate exactly how the covariance changes in 
that model. 
111. The Macroeconomic Model 
The model is one in which a representative household chooses 
consumption, labor supply to firms, and asset holdings (money and 
bonds) to maximize utility over an infinite horizon. Money holdings 
produce direct utility, a s  a stand-in for money's transactions- 
facilitating role. Firms are monopolistically competitive and must set 
their prices for two periods a t  a time. Each period one-half of the 
firms are allowed to change their price, so price setting is staggered 
a s  in Taylor (1980). There are only small differences between the 
model in this paper and the model Wolman (2005) uses to study 
the zero bound's implications for the behavior of real variables a t  
low inflation rates. Households in the model face distinct disutility 
for labor supplied to each firm. whereas in the earlier paper 
disutility depended only on total labor supplied. This feature makes 
marginal cost for firms that adjust their price less sensitive to the 
output of firms that do not adjust their prices. Because of the 
different labor supply specification, it is more convenient to use 
money-in-the-utility function than the shopping time approach of 
Wolman (2005). 
A. Consumers 
Consumers have preferences over a consumpt.ion aggregate (ct), 
labor supplied to each firm z (hdz)) and the ratio of real balances to 
2 ~ h i s  does not mean that the covariance-altering effect must be absent 
In a model with monetary neutrality. It may be present there as well. 
because the effect is one that concerns nominal variables only. 
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consumption (Mtl (Pt ct)) given by 
The variable is a random preference shock. The consumer's 
budget constraint is 
where Pt is the price level, Mi is nominal money balances chosen in 
period t ,  to carry over to t+ 1, Bi is holdings of one-period nominal 
zero-coupon bonds maturing a t  t+ 1, Rt is the interest rate ori 
nominal bonds, wt(z) is the real wage paid by firm z, I t  is leisure 
time, d, is real dividend payments from firms, and St is a lump 
sum tax or transfer paid to or from the government. The function 
g(Mtl(Pict)) can be thought of as standing in for time spent 
transacting. Defining real balances to be rni=MtlPt, the function 
g( . is 
IrC ' ~ - " ' ( r n ~ / c ~ )  r +Q, for rnt/cl<A - 45, g(mtlctl= @ . (rntlct) -  
I+' 
(12) 
A@"' +n, for rnt/clzA . 4'. g(m(lc1)= --- 
l + C  
with A >O, @>0 and '<0 .  Utility from real balances is thus 
increasing in the ratio of real balances to consumption, up to a 
satiation level of the ratio of real balances to consumption. 
Goods market structure. As has become standard in the sticky- 
price literature, we assume that every producer faces a downward 
sloping demand curve, with constant elasticity e.3 The composite 
consumption good is an aggregate of the differentiated products 
produced by a continuum of firms, ci= [ ~ct((o),l"- "'"d (olE""-", as in 
Dixit and Stiglitz(l977). The constant elasticity demands for each 
of the goods take the form: 
3 ~ e  assume &=lo .  
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where Pt(z) is the nominal price at time t of good z, and Pt Is the 
price index a t  time t, given by 
The staggered pricing assumption introduced above, together with 
an absence of other heterogeneity, means that all firms that adjust 
their prices in a given period choose the same price, and hence will 
face the same demand. It is then easier to write the consumption 
aggregate as 
where c ~ . ~  is the quantity consumed in period t of a good whose 
price was set in period t-j. The demands for each of the goods 
take the form: 
where PiC,, is the nominal price at time t of any good whose price 
was set j periods ago, and the price index can now be written 
Likewise, since all producers that adjust their prices In a given 
period hlre the same quantity of labor input, we can wrlte the 
disutility of labor as 
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where ho., is labor input at firms with newly set prices, and hlVt is 
labor input a t  firms with one-period-old prices. 
Optimization. If we attach Lagrange multiplier 1 to the budget 
constraint, so that At is the marginal value of real wealth, 
the first order conditions for the individual's maximization problem, 
with respect to ci, h,.r, Bt, and Mi are 
and 
B. Firms 
Each firm produces with an identical technology: 
Given the price that a firm is charging, it hires enough labor to 
meet the demand for its product at that price. Firms that do not 
adjust their price in a given period can thus be thought of as 
passive. Given that it has set a relative price (Pf-,)/Pi, real profits 
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for a firm of type j are 
that is, revenue minus cost. 
Firms choose PT optimally, to maxlmize the present discounted 
value of profits over the two periods that the price will be charged. 
Maximization of present value implies that a firm chooses its 
current relative price taking into account the effect on current and 
expected future profits. Substituting into (25) the demand curve 
(16) and the technology (24), the present discounted value of 
expected profits is given by 
for the two periods over which a price will be in effect. 
Differentiating (26) with respect to P;" and setting the resulting 
expression equal to zero, one sees that the optimal relative price 
satisfies 
C. Monetary and Fiscal Policy 
The policy variables - broadly defined - are Mf, Rt. Bf and St. Of 
these four variables, policy can exogenously choose a t  most two 
independent functions, but we will need two such independent 
functions irl. order to completely describe an equilibrium. We will 
also need the government budget constraint, which is 
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We assume there is a policy rule for the short-term nominal 
interest rate, given by 
where F is the steady state level of consumption. We also assume 
that the quantity of bonds is fixed at zero. This leaves the money 
supply to be determined by money demand, and lump sum taxes 
to be determined by the government budget constraint (28). 
D. Driving Processes 
The exogenous variables in the model are the preference shock 9t 
and the productivity shock at;  they are assumed to follow indepen- 
dent Markov processes. For now we shut down the productivity 
shock, so the only uncertainty involves t9t. 
E. Solving the Model 
We solve the model using the finite element method (see 
McGrattan (1996)). This involves picking a grid of points for the 
model's endogenous state variable(s). and then finding values of the 
other endogenous variables numerically for each grid point and 
each value of the discrete random forcing variable such that the 
model's equations are satisfied. The solution consists of mappings 
from the state variable to each of the other variables. Those 
mappings can be used in conjunction with the driving process for 
to simulate the model. 
There is one natural endogenous state variable, the ratio of the 
lagged price set by adjusting firms to the lagged price level (PE 1/Pt- I ) ,  
and to economize on characters we denote it by st : 
We also detrend the price level by the lagged price level, and define 
the detrended price (whfch is the inflation rate) by nt : 
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With these definitions, it can be shown that there are three 
fundamentally nonlinear equations that need to be solved for the 
three variables ct, m( and st+,, at a grid of points for st and for 
each realization of the shocks. Adopting recursive notation, the 
equations are the first-order condition for money holding (23). 
the first-order condition for bond-holding (221, 
and the optimal pricing condition (27), 
We can solve for each of the other variables as explicit functions of 
c, rn and s' follows. The price index (17) yields the inflation rate: 
The policy rule yields the nominal interest rate. 
The first order condition for consumption ylelds the marginal utility 
of wealth. 
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The firm's technologies, together with the demand functions they 
face yield labor input, 
and 
Finally, the first order conditions for labor supply yield real wages, 
wo= ~ h t ; i a  (39) 
and 
wl= yh; /A.  (401 
W. Results 
After describing how we calibrate the model, we present two sets 
of results. The first set compares how the equilibrium relationships 
described above vary across different inflation targets. While our 
emphasis is on the fact that these relationships may vary because 
of the zero bound on nominal interest rates, they will also vary 
because the nominal interest rate is a tax on money holding; a t  
higher inflation targets this tax is greater, leading households to 
economize on money holding and thereby making consumption 
more costly. The second set of results compares how simulated 
time series for the model vary across the different inflation targets; 
for this purpose we hold constant the sequence of shocks and the 
initial condition for the endogenous state variable. 
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TABLE 1 
CAI-IRRATION 
Parameter Description Value 
P Discount factor 0.995 
E Goods demand elasticity 10 
u Risk aversion 
Y Labor disutility coefficient 
v Inverse of labor supply elasticity 2 
d) Money in the utility function parameter 0.9588 
A Money in the utility function parameter 0.99801 
4- Money in the utility function parameter - 3 1.33099 
f n  Policy rule coefficient on inflation 1.5 
f c  Policy rule coefflcieni on output 0.125 
IQ1.Qz.93l Demand shock realizations 1 - 0.0125.0.0.0125j 
( 9  process is symmetric, remains in current state with prob = 0.6) 
Ia,?iI Productivitv realizations 11.11 
A. Calibration 
Table 1 contains the parameter values we use to generate 
numerical results. The parameters a, e. P and v are set to 
standard values in the literature; y is not important for any of our 
results, so we set it to one. The parameters 4, A and < are 
obtained by matching the model's money demand function to U.S. 
data for M1 and nondurables consumption, over the period 1959 to 
2004.4 The demand shock process is chosen arbitrarily, In order to 
help illustrate the model's behavior. 
B. Equilibrium finct ions 
In Figures 1 and 3 we plot the equilibrium relationships between 
selected endogenous variables and the single endogenous state 
variable, which is st, the ratio of the price set by adjusting firms in 
4 ~ h e r e  is little information in the data about the behavior of money 
demand a t  very low nominal interest rates. Thus there are many other 
parameter values for the g( ) function thal flt the data about a s  well a s  
those in Table 1. 
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A. 1-period nominal rate 8. 2-period nominal rate 
C. Yield curve slope D. Expectations component of slope 
E. Consumption F. Expected gross quarterly inflation 
G. State transition function H. Current gross quarterly inflation 
FIGURE 1 
HIGH INFLATION TARGET 
EQUILIBRIUM AS FUNCTION F  THE ENDOGENOUS STATE 
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E. Consumptlon F. Expected gross quraterly lnflatlon 
G. Future state (relative price of adjuster) H. Current gross quaflerly lnflatlon 
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E. Consumption F. Expected gross quarterly inflation 
G. State transition function H. Current gross quarterly inflation 
FIGURE 3
Low INFLATION TARGET 
EQUILIBRIUM AS FUNCTION F  THE ENDOGENOUS STATE 
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period t - 1 to the price level in period t - 1. Figure 1 is constructed 
using an  annual inflation target of five percent, whereas Figure 3 is 
constructed using an  inflation target of zero.5 Each figure contains 
eight panels each figure contains eight panels. In each panel there 
are three lines, corresponding to the three realizations of the 
demand shock. Solid corresponds to the lowest realization of 9 ,  
dashed to the middle realization, and dotted to the highest 
realization. The zero bound shows up immediately in Panel A of the 
two figures: When the inflation target is low, the equilibrium 
functions for the nominal interest rate are constant a t  zero for low 
enough values of the state variable. This translates in panel E to 
consumption behavior which is "distorted a t  low values of the 
state variable when the inflation target is low. As for our main 
concern, the term structure, a s  expected panel C shows that for 
low values of the state variable (where the short rate is zero) the 
yield curve is flatter a t  the low inflation target. Panel D reveals that 
for both inflation targets, the behavior of the yield curve is driven 
entirely by the expectations component. That is, the slope of the 
yield curve is not noticeably affected by covariance between future 
marginal utility and the future short rate.6 
Moving away for the moment from the term structure, we draw 
the reader's attention to panel G in Figures 1 and 3. This panel 
displays the transition function for the endogenous state variable, 
together with the 45 degree line. One can use this panel to trace 
out the evolution of the state variable for a given sequence of 4, by 
repeatedly going left or right to the 45 degree line and then u p  or 
down to the appropriate state transition function. Then, armed with 
a sequence for S~ we can use the equilibrium functions in the other 
panels to derive corresponding sequences for the other endogenous 
variables. This Is the method we use to generate the simulation 
results discussed next. 
si he horPsontal axis values are different in the two flgures because the 
stationary distribution of s varies with the lnflatlon target. In both cases we 
use the same percentage range for s. 
st his should perhaps not be surprising, given the lack of success in 
using standard macroeconomic models for asset pricing. In interesting 
recent work, Fhvenna and Seppaa (2005) find that a sticky-price model with 
habit-persistent preferences can generate an important covariance effect on 
the yield curve. 
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C. Simulated Time Series 
Figures 2 and 4 plot equilibrium sequences for the same 
variables displayed in Figures 1 and 3, for a given sequence of at. 
That is, we feed the same sequence of shocks into the high 
inflation economy and the low inflation economy and plot the paths 
of the seven variables. In both cases the initial condition is the 
nonstochastic steady state with 9= 0. 
We highlight three features of these figures. First, even though 
the equilibrium functions in Figure 3 show zero nominal interest 
rates occurring when the inflation target is low, the time path 
displayed in Figure 4-A does not display any realizations of zero 
nominal rates; the explanation is that there is an ergodic set for 
the state variable, and zero nominal interest rates do not occur 
when s is in the ergodic set. Second, and almost as a corollary to 
the first point, the effect of inflation on the yield curve visible in 
the equilibrium functions essentially vanishes in the simulation. 
This is not simply because zero rates do not occur in the simula- 
tion, but because there is no probability attached to their occurring 
in the future. 
Finally, note that the average level of consumption is higher 
under the low inflation target. This reflects the fact that low 
nominal interest rates make money less costly to hold, decreasing 
the effective price of consumption. We do not plot welfare, but it 
too is higher under the low inflation target. 
V. Conclusion 
Because the average level of the nominal interest rate will be 
lower the lower is the inflation target, a central bank that targets a 
very low inflation rate is more likely to occasionally encounter zero 
nominal interest rates. Because nominal interest rates cannot go 
below zero, the behavior of the term structure may then be 
sensitive to the level of the inflation target. In principle, such 
sensitivity may work through the pure expectations channel or 
through the conditional covariance between future marginal utility 
and the future price of a short-term bond. This paper has begun to 
investigate the effect of the inflation target on the term structure in 
a simple staggered pricing model. The model is simple enough that 
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G. Future state (relative price of adjuster) H. Current gross quarterly inflation 
FIGURE 4 
Low INFIATION TARGET 
SIMULATED T ~ M E  SERIES 
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we can study nearly exact solutions, and we can easily disentangle 
the pure expectations effect from the covariance effect. 
For the basic calibration studied thus far, there is essentially no 
action from the covariance channel. The first order of business now 
is to study a calibration where the ergodic set for the endogenous 
state variable includes realizations for which nominal interest rates 
are zero. Other modifications of interest would involve incorporating 
mechanisms which add persistence to the model. One can see from 
Figures 3 and 4 that the state variable is negatively autocorrelated, 
and this property is inherited by other variables in the model, 
chiefly among them inflation. Adding many bells and whistles is 
unappealing however: Virtues of the model are that it is simple 
enough (i) to be solved nonlinearly to a high degree of accuracy 
without large computing requirements, and (ii) that one can work 
through exactly the mechanisms driving particular results. 
(Received 17 September 2005; Revised 10 November 2005) 
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